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We contrast Free Trade Areas involving Mercosul and the EU25, the US and China, 
respectively, using a new CGE model and associated database. Roughly, the China FTA lies 
halfway the other two, a bias towards the US pattern being suggested. When considering China 
a new Northern partner, protective deals don’t seem advisable. China’s advantages  should 
prevail when facing the US or the EU: its need of capital goods, for instance, may open 
profitable cross-exchanges. China’s emergence can be a positive factor, if placed in an enlarged 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The trade and development literature quite often states, in a somewhat definitive way, 
that South-South agreements shouldn’t be pursued, given the limited welfare enhancing 
possibilities they offer. North-South free trade areas, on the contrary, are usually hailed 
as the right option for a southern bloc. In this paper we contrast three integration 
schemes involving Mercosul, namely Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with the EU25, the US 
and China. 
Within the South American context, Mercosul stands as the main recent 
integration initiative. The bloc is progressively becoming a major player, eager for 
partners that would allow a fuller development of its production capabilities. The two 
first FTAs are clearly with a Northern partner, but show nearly opposite results, neither 
exactly desirable. The US one channels Mercosul’s imports to the States, all other 
partners loosing market share in the bloc; the latter has nearly the opposite effect, 
Mercosul drastically re-orienting its exports to the EU25, while increasing its import 
demand in most other markets. 
It was expected that the third option – something that may perhaps come true 
sooner than imagined - would characterize a South-South agreement, given the status of 
both partners. Nevertheless, the Chinese option revealed, though in less intensity, 
patterns close to ones in the previous agreements, suggesting that the Eastern Dragon 
already shares, in the specific instances analysed here, properties akin to developed 
economies. In spite of a proviso on the quality of Chinese data, the results clearly signal 
that the Asian giant is already an important and serious partner, inducing a North-South 
pattern in such agreement 
Our findings may be taken as adding to the uneasiness of those who at present 
suffer from ‘fear of China’. The scarce academic literature on the China – South 
America economic relations usually emphasises the threat they represent to the 
debatable competitiveness of the latter economies, Lall, Weiss and Oikawa (2005) and 
Moreira (2004). We look at them from a more encompassing and somewhat different 
viewpoint, and try to go deeper into the results, extracting additional lessons on the 
potential role of China as a partner to Mercosul. 
All the analyses were conducted using a brand new static CGE model, AMIDA 
– Analysing Mercosul’s Integration Decisions and Agreements, to which is associated a 
notable database, particularly in relation to the Americas. We use the CGE tool one step ahead, inferring weaknesses and advantages present whether the bloc faces the two 
Northern or the (supposedly) Southern partner. The way to do this is to systematically 
cross information along the three different FTAs. By assuming the formation of ideal, 
full FTAs and contrasting the three sets of results we are able to draw a broader picture, 
which goes beyond the usual gains & losses analysis of standard CGE applications. 
Moreover, the paper is perhaps the first attempt to incorporate China as a serious actor 
in CGE evaluations involving Mercosul.      
  The structure of the text is the following. Section 2 contains a few lines on 
methodological aspects related to the model and discusses data sources and decisions. It 
also presents the sectoral aggregation, the regions and the scenarios. Base year flows are 
surveyed in Section 3, where results are also commented. Section 4 tries to make a 
deeper assessment of the findings. Section 5 assesses the probable impact of some 
missing model features and then concludes. 
 
 
2. Basic facts on the model and the database 
 
2.1. Technical background 
 
The model follows those developed in Flôres (1997, 2003), being a static, computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) structure in which strategic interaction takes place in certain 
sectors. Contrary to the common practice of introducing ad hoc “scale gains” in an 
otherwise perfect competition CGE
1, perfect and (explicitly) imperfect competition 
sectors co-exist in the model. This approach was fashioned in Gasiorek, Smith and 
Venables (1992) – drawing on a partial equilibrium formulation by Smith and Venables 
(1988) -, who used it to evaluate the impacts of the Europe 92 initiative.  
In general, due to the scale effects – enhanced in the larger markets created by 
the regional integrations -, welfare gains are higher than those produced by the perfect 
competition alternatives
2. However, in all FTAs examined here, country markets remain 
segmented as what is at stake is not the creation of a common market. The results are 
                                                            
1 For a discussion of this topic, and the (usually) accompanying “dynamic elasticities” device, 
see, among others, Flôres (2000).  
2 See, for instance, Baldwin and Venables (1995).  
 driven by the joint effect of lowering trade barriers, production efficiency in the 
imperfect competition sectors and the internal search for equilibrium. Though the latter 
is common to all CGE structures, this overall combination may point to patterns unable 
to be unveiled by other models.  
Handling the two kinds of competition in a single general equilibrium 
framework poses theoretical problems related to the existence and uniqueness of 
solutions, fully discussed, for instance, in Chapter 11 of Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997). 
In our particular case, the specifications used guarantee the existence of a unique 
solution.  
Flôres and Watanuki (2005) provide a detailed description of the model 
equations, carefully discussing their role and pros and cons. Calibration and data issues 
are also addressed in detail. Anyone interested in knowing in depth the workings of the 
model should resort to this Manual; in the remaining of this sub-section, we briefly 
outline some key points. 
For each economy, in the demand side, there is a representative consumer with a 
Dixit-Stiglitz-Spence CES utility function in an Armington-like tree structure. In the 
production side, perfect competition sectors may work either under CES or Cobb-
Douglas technologies, and intermediate inputs are treated – in all sectors - via a shortcut 
using the input-output (I-O) coefficients.  
Firms in imperfect competition sectors are symmetric and play a Cournot-Nash 
strategy in each market/region. A key parameter is the perceived elasticity of demand in 
region i, for product j, manufactured in region i’, e(i’,i; j). If V(i;j) is the elasticity of 
substitution, in region i, between goods j from different origins and s(i’,i; j) is region’s 
i’ market share for product j, in region i, it is defined by the equation: 
 
1/e(i’,i; j)  = 1/V(i;j)  + ( 1 - 1/V(i;j) ) s(i’,i; j)              .                          (1) 
 
Wages are flexible, as labour is assumed mobile among sectors, but the (sector 
specific) capital allocation is kept constant; in equilibrium, different closures (even 
“disequilibrium” ones, like trade surpluses or deficits) can be easily applied. Total 
labour remains constant in each economy. The structure of the model – by combining both standard and innovative 
features
3 - allows portraying distinct levels of regional integration in a progressive 
scenario evaluation.  
 
2.2.  The data set 
 
A notable Western Hemisphere Database, combining information from the UN, 
Eurostat, OECD, TRAINS, US Trade Representative, CEPAL, the World Bank, 
national statistical institutes and central banks, GTAP’s latest database and the IDB was 
produced. 
The base year refers to 2001, which seemed adapted to the regions and particular 
features of the model. We consider this a fairly ideal decision, as 2002 and 2003 were 
not very representative years for Brazil and, especially, Argentina, and much 
information for 2004 was still unavailable. As for China, it was already perceived as a 
major player, as papers like Young (2002) testify.  
Production and demand structures received careful attention in the case of 
Mercosul. A key element relates to the I-O matrices for Brazil and Argentina: the 1996 
and 2000 versions, respectively, were updated and inserted. Also, Armington elasticities 
came from special sources for these two countries. Capital remuneration rates were 
improved whenever possible. 
The US, Mexican, AC, Japanese, Chinese and EU economic data were 
reasonably checked. Substitution elasticities were either picked from the literature – as a 
best, educated guess – or came directly from domestic sources. 
Chinese data are always a source of debate, Young (2003), though we’ve relied 
on knowledge produced by IADB (2004). Hong Kong data are in a separate region
4, and 
we’ve used the classical FOB/CIF convention for Chinese trade flows, contrary to what 
is advocated, for instance, by the US-China Business Council. As we work with the 
country as a whole, more serious problems with internal, domestic statistics, as 
discussed in Naughton (1999) or Poncet (2003), are avoided. However, these 
considerations do not invalidate the proviso that statistical data for China are probably 
among the least reliable ones in our database.   
                                                            
3 See, as mentioned before, Flôres and Watanuki (2005) for complete details. 
4 Actually, with other nine “tigers”, in the region called Asia10 (see further, in the text). Information on the complete protection structure is always debatable, even if one 
sticks to the case of tariffs. Preferential tariffs – especially those originating from trade 
agreements – are usually poorly depicted. They were thoroughly reviewed in cases like 
Mercosul, the US and the EU. Given the importance of the last two regions, 
improvements on their protection structure were made with the aid of data from the 
United States International Trade Commission – USITC website and EUROSTAT and 
Messerlin (2001), respectively.  
Data from INTAL, ALADI and recent studies conducted by IPEA in Brazil were 
also useful complementary sources. At the level of detail of the present study, many 
nuances and, sometimes, important tariff peaks either disappear or are smoothed out 
when aggregated to produce a single figure for the sector. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
protection structure was computed bottom-up, easily allows translating any detailed (8-
digits) concession/restriction to the aggregation level of the model. 
Beyond tariffs, Flôres (1997, 2003) and Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1992) 
assumed the existence of additional trade costs which can be associated to a variety of 
factors, impairing or raising the cost of trade between countries, like transportation, 
bureaucracy, distribution margins, etc. Real FTAs zero the tariffs and reduce, without 
necessarily eliminating, these latter costs. We estimated gross transport margins with 
the aid of COMTRADE, minimising discrepancies with official statistics. In most 
bilateral flows they amount to less than 10 per cent, though there are significant 
differences at the sectoral level, due to inconsistencies and misreporting. They were 
then reduced, between the partners in each scenario, by 4 percentage points, at most, as 
trade facilitation. No evaluation was made of other trade costs.  
 
2.3.  Sectors and Regions 
 
We aimed at an as comprehensive as possible world regionalisation and sectoral 
disaggregation. The economies were decomposed into twenty-five sectors distributed 
along six groups, namely
5: 
  
                                                            
5 For the sectors, names between brackets are as they appear in the tables, in the next sections. I. Agriculture: Wheat, corn and other grains (Grains); Vegetables & fruits; Oilseeds & 
soybeans; Sugar; Coffee, rice & other crops (Coffee, rice & others); Animal 
products.  
II. Agribusiness (ab): Bovine meat (#); Poultry meat (#); Dairy products; Beverages & 
tobaccos (Bev. & tobacco)  (#); Vegetable oils.  
III. Energy: Minerals; Energy products. 
IV. Light Manufactures: Textiles & apparel (Text. & apparel); Leather, wood & paper 
(Leather, wood, paper); Other light manufactures (Other light manufac.).  
V. Heavy Manufactures: Chemical and plastic products (Chemicals & plastics); Ferrous 
metals; Non-ferrous metals; Motor vehicles  (#); Other transport equipment (Other 
transp. equip.)  (#); Electric equipment; Machinery.   
VI. Services: Utilities & construction; Trade and services. 
  
The first five groups comprise the 23 trade-in-goods sectors that will be the main 
focus of our analyses. Five out of them – those marked with a ‘#’ above – were 
modelled under imperfect competition (i.c.). These structures are better portrayed in the 
model regions related to Mercosul, the US, Japan and the EU25 (see below). Arguments 
can be raised on the choice of the i.c. sectors, dairy products qualifying at least as well 
as bovine meat, and electric equipment and machinery being other important candidates. 
Notwithstanding, data availability for properly characterising these more complex 
markets had to be a key factor in directing the present choice.     
Decisions on the regions face a classical dilemma in CGE practice: due attention 
to the areas of concern (and those which affect them) together with care in not 
fragmenting too much the model, what, among other practical problems, may add 
distortions to its construction and operation. As our main objective lies in analysing the 
different scenarios from a Mercosul perspective, we divided the world into the 




2. the United States 
3. the Andean Community – AC (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela) 4. the Rest of the Americas (or Western Hemisphere) – RoWH (comprising the 
remaining 23 potential FTAA countries) 
  5. the EU25 countries 
 6.  Japan 
 7.  China 
8. the Asian 10 emerging economies - Asia10 (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillipines, Thailand and 
Vietnam) 
  9. the Rest of the World - RoW. 
  
As regards the quality of the data adaptation to these regions, the best ones seem, 
as mentioned, those for Mercosul, Mexico, the AC and the US, as well as the EU25 and 
Japan. The Rest of the Western Hemisphere is naturally a simplification, though it 
includes, beyond the whole Central America, countries like Canada and Chile. 
Equilibrium flows to the Rest of the World may also be obtained by difference and 
econometric techniques. In this last region, are found countries that may be relevant for 
certain sectors, like Australia and New Zealand, or India. All the (former) New Tigers, 
beyond new emerging Asian economies, which are becoming competitive either in 
specific agricultural goods or in traditional sectors like textiles, are in Asia10.  
Table 1 shows, for Mercosul, the values of the trade flows, for the twenty-three 
merchandise sectors, plus the services group. It is an essential tool for understanding the 
scope of the model and the true meaning of the results discussed here.  
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
2.4.  The scenarios 
 
Three scenarios, which will be called basic, were defined. Actually, their corresponding 
integration options may be translated into manifold ways as well as combined in 
multiple forms. However, in their basic formulation they suit the objectives of this 
paper. Indeed, our experiment consists in simulating three perfect FTAs: two will have a 
“Northern character” and the third, with China, is exactly the one we want to check whether it presents features common to the other two. The three agreements to be 
discussed are: 
 
Scenario A. The first clearly North-South scenario: Mercosul closes a full FTA 
agreement with the US. 
Scenario B. The second North-South one, with the EU25-Mercosul FTA fully 
implemented.  
Scenario C. This scenario analyses the impact of Mercosul’s free trade with China. 
  
As full FTAs are implemented in all cases, a clearer cross evaluation of them can 
be pursued.   
 
 
3.  Analysis 
 
3.1.  A glimpse on the structure of the base year 
Table 2 is a partial summary, for the three regions at stake, of information contained in 
Table 1. In spite of the lower volumes – and Mercosul’s 131,7 m US$ only trade surplus 
- one sees that China roughly follows the pattern of the two other regions, notably as 
regards a positive performance in Heavy Manufactures trade, the main imprint of a 
North-South relation. It is also the only of the three to present a surplus in Light 
Manufactures trade.  
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  It is interesting to notice the modest surpluses Mercosul enjoys in the 
Agribusiness group, either with China or the US, relatively to the EU25. Table 3, where 
the relative exports and imports profiles of the three regions are displayed, enhances this 
perception. Both in exports and imports – if one aggregates the two manufactures 
groups – the Chinese figures aren’t much far from the EU ones. As expected, the 
biggest demandeur – in relative terms - of Mercosul’s Energy exports is China.   
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.2.  The North-South FTAs 
 
We concentrate initially on the impacts in the trade flows, displaying results as 
percentage changes from Table 1 entries, on the Mercosul trade flows. All figures 
should be basically evaluated in relation to each other, within and between tables, and 
not taken separately, as a precise single value for the changes. The importance of this 
sub-section is to identify situations – or rather sectors and regions – where a deeper 
insight on the consequences of the FTAs can be obtained. Detailed quantification of 
profits or losses should be made at a greater level of detail, ultimately with the aid of 
partial equilibrium models. 
  Tables 4 and 5 show the regional distribution of the increases, according to the 
five groups of sectors
6. Both agreements present territorial externalities with however 
certain nuances. The US one seems to induce either advantages or efficiency gains in 
light and heavy manufactures sectors, where Mercosul is able to increase its exports to 
all other areas in the world. In the latter group, sensible increases take place in the three 
Asiatic regions – Japan, China and Asia10 -, the EU25 and the RoW. Nevertheless, the 
imports pattern is largely dominated by a very high penetration of the US flows, with, 
but for agricultural sectors, decreases in the other sources. Though these may be small, 
for the manufactures’ groups figures are again more significant, particularly for Heavy 
Manufactures, exactly in the same five regions already mentioned. Very clearly, the 
agreement will provoke trade deviation, in these sectors, from Asia and the EU25 to US 
suppliers. A similar pattern, reasonably significant, also takes place with the energy 
group. 
  Increases in exports to the partner are usually more modest in scenario A than in 
B. This very often corresponds to lower absolute values. Manufacturing groups IV and 
V sell, to the US, under scenario A, extra values of 1,98 bn US$ and 3,30 bn US$, 
respectively, while the much higher European percentages under scenario B amount to 
2,83 bn US$ and 3,55 bn US$, respectively: a sizeable difference in the first case.    
                                                            
6 Both can be complemented by other tables, showing the same information at the sector level. 
These, as well as any more detailed table, can be obtained from the authors.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The EU25 FTA pattern in Table 5 is nearly opposite to the one depicted in Table 
4. The considerable rise in exports to the EU takes place at the expense of generalised 
decreases in all other regions, for every sector group but Heavy Manufactures, where 
only the Mexican and US flows – two neighbouring EU competitors - decrease. 
Imports, however, increase almost everywhere, exceptions being the Asian regions and 
Mexico in Light Manufactures, and all destinations in Heavy Manufactures, where there 
is a clear trade deviation in favour of the partner’s exports. The US FTA forces a 
decrease in all Mercosul’s imports, Agriculture excepted; though exports rise 
everywhere, but again in Agriculture. 
Table 6 describes in detail the changes in trade flows under the two scenarios. 
Four out of the five highest increases for exports, in the EU25 case (B), are in 
commodities (2) and agribusiness (2) sectors, the other being textiles & apparel. In the 
US case, two heavy manufactures sectors appear, beyond one in the agribusiness – 
thanks largely to orange juice - and two traditional ones, textiles (again) included.  
In a rough overall picture, the EU25 FTA favours demand for more traditional 
Mercosul’s exports, while the US one promotes some higher value-added exports. Even 
so, there are sensible increases in Mercosul’s exports of non-ferrous metals and 
machinery to the EU, for instance. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The protectionist European CAP - Common Agricultural Policy shows itself 
indirectly in the significant increases in bovine and poultry meat; US figures in the 
agribusiness sectors being more modest. However, the EU25 remains competitive in 
this area and, either due to this, or to compensate the demand surge in the EU, or both, 
changes in Mercosul’s imports of agricultural commodities and agribusiness are, but for 
two exceptions (grains and bovine meat), considerably higher in the EU25 FTA. Indeed, this is also valid for most of the remaining sectors, only exceptions being other 
transport equipment and electric equipment.  
At the bottom of the Table, the value of the correlation coefficients between each 
two corresponding vectors is displayed (not including services). Given the very high 
increase in bovine meat exports in Scenario B, the coefficients, for exports, were 
computed with and without this sector. There is no (linear) relation between the two 
exports patterns, while the imports ones show a certain degree of common behaviour.  
The combination of all results suggests a few things. First, both FTAs with a 
Northern bloc will enhance Mercosul’s competitiveness in Heavy Manufactures, very 
likely at the cost of inducing a considerable (though needed) readjustment in this group 
of sectors. Second, regionally induced patterns may vary significantly: while Scenario A 
transforms the US into the major Mercosul supplier, in spite of probably also turning the 
Southern Cone into a more competitive bloc, Scenario B strongly channels Mercosul 
exports to the EU, in such a way that it is impelled to demand more goods from all other 
regions. Clearly, this signals to the more distorting EU protection structure, but also 
warns on the higher US dependency the sole completion of Scenario A may entail. Both 
situations seem, in principle, undesirable. 
 
3.3.  The Mercosul-China FTA 
 
Following the same caveats in the beginning of the previous subsection, we now look at 
the Mercosul-China FTA. Table 7, displaying, by sector groups, the regional changes 
induced, is a companion to Tables 4 and 5. Table 8 gives more detailed information on 
the total and Chinese flows, and pairs with Table 6.     
Comparing Table 7 with Table 5, we see that, qualitatively, its pattern is very 
similar to the one generated by the Mercosul-EU25 FTA. The apparent difference, in 
exports, lies in group V. The well acknowledged Chinese voracity for capital goods 
reveals itself in the enormous five times increase in Mercosul’s exports, leaving no 
room to satisfy the nearby demands. Exports now suffer a deviation in the two Asian 
and RoW regions, being not affected in the remaining of the globe. But Japan and 
Asia10 are – like Mexico and the US in the EU25 FTA – two “neighbouring” 
competitors of China, for Mercosul`s group V exports. This suggests that closer 
associations with the Middle Empire should be jointly pursued with others involving 
economies in these two competing regions, where significant intra-industrial trade with China takes place, Ahearne et al. (2003). Such a strategy would probably reduce likely 
trade deviations, opening novel, sometimes compensatory, opportunities.  
In the case of imports, the similarity is a little less, all regions, as regards group 
IV, being now affected. China reaps traditional sources of light manufactures in the 
Western Hemisphere – the US, the Andean Community and the Rest of the WH – that 
the EU25 was unable to eliminate. But the more surprising issue lies in Heavy 
Manufactures where, though the deviations are relatively modest, China becomes the 
sole Mercosul supplier to considerably increase its exports, exactly as happens in the 
FTAs with the EU and the US.  
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  If, in the regionally induced pattern, affinities took place with scenario B, then 
the opposite is expected to manifest with the US. Indeed, in exports, as seen, the US 
doesn’t exclude other destinations (but in Agriculture), while, in imports, it wipes out 
competitors in a much more pervasive way than China does. 
Table 8 shows that, in general, though the figures for the ‘China flows’ are 
usually high to very high, the impact on the total flows is small. As regards exports, the 
latter don’t exhibit either the spectacular surges in the EU25 case or – with two 




Insert Table 8 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In terms of the overall induced exports pattern, the Chinese effect is now closer 
to the US one, giving rise to a maybe “more natural” Hecksher-Ohlin effect, less 
distorted by the huge increases in Agriculture and Agribusiness sectors that are 
triggered by the EU25 FTA. Whether this comparative-advantage-based pattern will be 
a growth inducing one, or will evolve into a vertical intra-industry relationship, with the 
upper goods coming from the East, is something to be closely checked. What looks perhaps worrying is that, in the China FTA, many indications of contraction appear for 
total exports in exactly the very same two groups. This suggests a stronger than 
expected rearrangement of Mercosul’s economy caused by the around 132 per cent total 
increase in its trade relations with China. 
 
4. A broader view 
 
4.1. Labour, output and welfare 
 
Changes in trade flows have not a clear, unidirectional relation with what happens to 
labour, output and, most importantly, welfare. We first concentrate on a synthetic 
evaluation of the three scenarios from these standpoints. 
We remind that labour is kept constant in each economy/region, sectoral values 
being reallocated in each scenario. Given this, and the logic of the model, in general, 
changes induced on labour and output have the same direction. As a consequence, 
dividing the respective changes by sector, in order to evaluate the variations in gross 
labour productivity for each agreement, results not very informative. The constant total 
labour closure enhances the absolute value of the related changes, so that, nearly 
uniformly, productivity decreases for a sector where output expands, and increases for 
those that suffer a contraction. Though this can make sense, the fact that it is a 
consequence of the mechanics of the model makes the productivity analysis less 
realistic. 
Table 9 shows the different correlation coefficients between the 23 (sectoral) 
changes, both in manufactures’ labour and output, for each pair of scenarios, as well as 
simple summary statistics. In the case of labour, the China-EU25 figure is somewhat 
close to the US-EU25 one; the same happening, in a clearer way, with output, though 
now in absolute values. This makes for mixed evidence on how close the Chinese 
impacts are to the other two sets. Reminding the comparatively low values obtained in 
Table 6
7 for the changes due to the US and EU scenarios, the correlation approach 
becomes even less conclusive.  
It is worth noticing the much greater dispersion of output changes, though its 
averages are considerably lower than those for labour; something due, again, to the fact 
                                                            
7 With respect to those in Table 8. that the former aren’t constrained. If the coefficient of variation is taken as a rough 
measure of the amount of adjustment implied by the FTA, the US one ranks top, with a 
26,7 coefficient, while China has the more modest value, equal to 7,6.    
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 10 tries to shed more light on the previous results by showing the full set 
of output changes. The Mercosul-EU25 agreement induces a more worrying contraction 
on the heavy manufacturing sectors motor vehicles,  other transport equipment and 
machinery, what, for the two last ones, also happens with the US agreement, though 
with less intensity. This might be due to the major unleashing of agribusiness exports to 
the EU distorting somewhat the results. Moreover, given the more traditional sides of 
the European economy, there is less scope for Mercosul manufactures in that market, 
the reverse taking place.  
  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
  Notable increases, in the case of the EU25, are the expected ones: bovine and 
poultry meat; the remaining ones are modest, never surpassing 4 per cent, what applies 
uniformly for the US. A notable contraction takes place in other light manufactures for 
China, at the same time that a surge takes place in motor vehicles.  
  Another single figure of merit is provided by Table 11, which ranks the options 
with respect to two welfare measures. In terms of real GDP variation, China surpasses 
the US, though still far from the EU25 results. If the finer, equivalent variation (EV) is 
used, though still a competitive option, it moves to the lowest position. This means that 
China, if on one hand seems to induce, via its FTA with Mercosul, a trade flows pattern 
similar to that created by the EU25 one, on the other hand, in welfare gains, it is already 
competing with a US-Mercosul FTA; an assertion that will be better qualified in the 
next subsection. Welfare results – both in plain real GDP variation and in equivalent variation 
(EV) – are however surprisingly low, for a model including imperfect competition. The 
explanation probably lies on the fact that a substantial part of the gains, in all three 
agreements, derive from the perfect competition sectors, those in strategic interaction 
many times suffering a contraction.  
  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 by here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.2.  Is China a Northern partner ?  
 
Considering the signs of the changes, an additional way of assessing how close the 
China profile in Table 10
8 is to the other two is to count the number of full coincidences 
and oppositions, plus that when China matches only one of them. There are 11 
coincidences and 8 oppositions, meaning that the US and EU25 changes move in the 
same direction (“as China”) in 19 sectors. In 3 out of the 4 remaining sectors, the sign of 
the Chinese change matches that of the US. Overall, for 14 sectors, the China impact is 
qualitatively equal to the US one, the same occurring for 12 ones, in the case of the 
EU25.       
Neglecting variations less than 1 per cent, a deeper insight can be obtained. Only 
four figures remain for China, while four pairs related to the other FTAs disappear. 
These four remaining sectors are telling. In textiles and apparel China is responsible for 
the only sizeable output increase. Increases are also present in motor vehicles and other 
transport equipment, where now it acts as a counterpoint to significant (specially in the 
EU25 case) decreases in the other two FTAs. On the other hand, in other light 
manufactures the contraction is much more sweeping than those provoked by the US 
and the EU.  
Summing up, a FTA with China doesn’t interfere in the fate of 11 sectors that 
could be defined as winning (positive changes, higher than 1 per cent), nor in that of 
five losers (negative changes, higher than 1 per cent) when considering the Northern 
agreements
9. It does “save” two Heavy Manufactures sectors and provides both a better 
                                                            
8 Only for manufactures. 
9 It doesn’t interfere either in three other sectors, where changes were thoroughly negligible. and an even worse fate to other two, in the Light Manufactures group. This explains 
both the low correlation with the US and the negative one with the EU25 in Table 8.  
Mercosul, in the Northern integrations, suffers contractions in beverages and 
tobaccos, energy products, chemicals and plastics, non-ferrous metals, motor vehicles, 
other transport equipment, machinery and other light manufactures; with China, only in 
the last one a contraction takes place. The reverse is that no action takes place in the 
other winning sectors, as mentioned above. This must however be qualified, as six out 
of these sectors own their classification to only one FTA result. Indeed, all are in the 
Agriculture and Agribusiness groups, and the FTA is the EU25 one, which presents 
perhaps a more peculiar result, driven by the opening of the CAP-protected market
10.  
Despite the proviso that the aggregation level of the sectoral division blurs a mix 
of positive and negative situations, the above synthesis looks quite reasonable in terms 
of framing more clearly the role of China, as of in 2001. Even conceding that such base 
year plays in favour of Mercosul, as regards trade with China, the picture just described 
undeniably places the Asian giant as an interesting alternative – or rather complement -, 
with a Northern touch, to the two developed partners the bloc usually considers. 
Unfortunately, it also lays bare a key deficiency of the bloc, which is really 
competitive in a few classical manufactures sectors and selected segments of the 
agribusiness (plus sugar): lower value-added activities. All its non-competitive areas 
comprise key industrial sectors. 
Table 12, showing the pattern induced on Mercosul flows by the China FTA, 
complements the analysis. The striking feature revealed by the Table is that the induced 
profiles – both for exports and imports - move closer to those displayed in Table 3 by 
the US. This is evident for the two manufactures groups, a bit less for the three other 
groups, due to the still considerable weight of the agriculture-agribusiness complex. 
China will certainly continue to be an important customer of Mercosul`s 
agricultural commodities and a selective importer in Agribusiness and Energy. 
However, action – under free trade – will move to higher value-added products. 
Mercosul still runs a modest trade surplus, but the combined deficit in manufactures 
increases by 16,9 per cent. If the internal fragmentation identified by Poncet (2005), 
coupled to impending macroeconomic and systemic financial crises, does not progress 
                                                            
10 As mentioned in section 3.2 . in a negative direction, the patterns here obtained are then likely to display a more 





Our study focussed mainly on market access for goods. The dynamics of other crucial 
concessions – like, for instance, those regarding foreign direct investment – may greatly 
affect the results here discussed. Moreover, better treatment of the services sector seems 
mandatory.  
Another missing issue is rules of origin (RoO). Since at least Hoekman (1993), 
specialists have been emphasizing the role played by RoO in concessions and 
preferential agreements, like the Generalised System of Preferences or the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Nevertheless, adequate treatment of RoO in 
the CGE framework is only beginning, and in fairly debatable ways. The IADB has 
been making efforts to develop a system that may allow an easier and more systematic 
way of treating these questions, something to be incorporated in later versions of the 
model
11. Probably not for China, but for the other two FTAs this may have an impact on 
the results. 
Finally, in terms of issues not covered, the WTO dimension will certainly add 
further disturbances. In sectors where Mercosul will undoubtedly reap gains in almost 
any scenario, like leather, wood, paper or even agriculture in general, multilateral 
liberalisation will have an impact on these very gains, by enhancing the market access 
of other competitors, not only underdeveloped ones, but the likes of India or other 
Asiatic countries, not forgetting the US and, of course, China itself. We conjecture that 
this will enhance the predominance of manufactures in all post-FTA flows.  
In qualitative terms, being a less competitive economy, Mercosul, when facing 
FTA’s with the US or the EU, was able to accrue profits in its performing traditional 
sectors, where, to its competitive advantages, must be added the richness of related 
natural endowments. In the more modern sectors the situation was not very clear. In 
general, a contraction will take place, imports will raise and, rather than from a 
competitiveness effect – which would set the sector in better shape for surviving in the 
                                                            
11 See Bouët et al. (2003) for one approach within the CGE context, and Garay and Cornejo 
(2002), as one of the documents related to the IADB efforts. world arena – welfare gains in the imperfect competition sectors seem mostly due to the 
sheer reduction in tariffs. This pattern is reasonably serious in scenario A, but also arises 
when the US is discarded for the EU25.  
The broad finding above re-emerges, even if in more modest terms, when a FTA 
is formed with China. Such agreement puts the relationship between the two regions 
roughly halfway those Mercosul entertained with the two Northern economies, a bias 
towards the US pattern being suggested. On the one hand, given that the Middle Empire 
is still a reasonable importer of agricultural goods – though not much, at least yet, of 
agribusiness ones – the regional re-arrangements it produces are closer to those effected 
by the EU25 rather than the US. On the other hand, the induced trade patterns move 
closer to the ones with the US, signalling that a fully advanced industrial power is on 
the rise. With a difference however: it is also threatening in traditional, light 
manufactures. 
The signs of China getting closer to the US and the EU25 - in terms of “after 
FTA” effects – only add to the certainty of its importance in the very near future, even 
in South America.  
It is high time for Mercosul to take bold steps in its integration project and trade 
policy. As for the latter, it must decide whether, moved primarily by its internal forces, 
it will streamline and upgrade its exports profile, or let it at the mercy of distinct 
integration shocks.  
We hope the first option will be pursued. In doing this, it must take into account 
China, as a new Northern partner. This may have several implications. Protective deals 
to (temporarily) secure positions in light manufactures sectors, as Central American 
economies did with the US through the recent CAFTA, don’t seem much advisable. 
Rather, China’s advantages should be evaluated as when facing the US or the EU. Its 
need of capital goods, for instance, may open opportunities of profitable cross-
exchanges in heavy manufactures. 
Strategic, rather than protective associations, should also be searched in an 
enlarged policy space where to the US - EU polarity China, together with its dynamic 
Asian neighbours, would be counter-posed. Contrary to the usually pessimistic views, 
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Table 1: Mercosul: Trade flows – exports (fob) and imports (cif), 2001 -, by regions 
(10
6 US$). 
1.A: Exports (to) [cont.] 
REGIONS 
SECTORS 
Mexico US  AC RoWH  EU25 
Grains  19,0  3,0  191,6 155,5 301,4 
Vegetables & fruits  210,7  2,7  18,2  54,7  797,0 
Oilseeds & soybeans  26,1  44,4  116,4  52,6  2.312,9 
Sugar 105,6  -  6,0  107,7  24,4 
Coffee, rice & others  464,6  37,6  47,0  112,9  1.441,3 
Animal products  838,0  53,0  207,5  271,7  1.976,7 
Bovine meat (ab)   39,5  2,6  14,7  215,7  547,8 
Poultry meat (ab)  186,7  -  5,3  18,9  828,8 
Dairy products (ab)  33,9  94,7  55,0  29,9  0,5 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  62,0  9,8  15,6  36,9  91,2 
Vegetable oils (ab)  39,0  1,3  256,6  221,6  3.653,7 
Minerals 556,7  72,9  87,4  228,2  1.857,8 
Energy products  639,1  1,4  61,0  2.104,2  226,9 
Text. & apparel  357,0  49,8  158,8  152,6  329,2 
Leather, wood, paper  3.306,2  188,2  215,3  512,3  2.438,9 
Other  light  manufac.  115,9  11,4 27,1 24,7 48,8 
Chemicals  &  plastics  1.033,9  204,6 745,4 732,6 954,0 
Ferrous  metals 1.382,3  154,9 303,6 275,8 695,5 
Non-ferrous  metals  861,4  70,7  134,5 206,7 837,7 
Motor  vehicles 1.356,0  1.142,6  593,8 445,0 931,1 
Other transp. equip.  2.430,4  9,7  25,1  44,1  707,2 
Electric  equipment  1.417,6  104,7 131,3 136,9 213,9 
Machinery  1.387,2  283,2 578,3 519,3 793,2 
(Services) 2.166,4  139,5  85,5  515,4  5.839,4 




1.A: Exports (to) [end] 
REGIONS 
SECTORS 
Japan China  Asia10 RoW 
TOTAL 
Grains 134,6  2,5  207,1  1.112,2  2.127,0 
Vegetables & fruits  1,4  -  10,2  88,7  1.183,6 
Oilseeds & soybeans  171,3  1.496,7  286,5  308,6  4.815,4 
Sugar 0,2  25,1  106,1  1.639,2  2.014,3 
Coffee, rice & others  194,0  88,3  84,4  423,1  2.893,1 
Animal products  299,2  56,3  179,6  526,6  4.408,7 
Bovine meat (ab)   7,4  1,0  103,1  324,1  1.255,9 
Poultry meat (ab)  177,8  6,2  206,5  731,1  2.161,2 
Dairy products (ab)  1,9  -  4,4  40,2  260,6 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  43,9  0,4  9,6  28,6  298,0 
Vegetable oils (ab)  31,1  21,5  638,9  2.285,3  7.149,0 
Minerals 716,9  668,4  336,0  668,2  5.192,4 
Energy products  -  27,3  -  168,8  3.228,6 
Text. & apparel  40,6  126,2  17,8  66,2  1.298,2 
Leather, wood, paper  240,3  387,0  580,2  371,1  8.239,6 
Other light manufac.  16,6  1,4  7,8  20,7  274,4 
Chemicals & plastics  107,4  78,4  159,3  357,4  4.373,2 
Ferrous metals  113,2  116,3  429,8  385,5  3.857,1 
Non-ferrous metals  385,3  24,3  52,5  379,7  2.952,8 
Motor vehicles  9,3  130,0  31,7  332,4  4.972,0 
Other transp. equip.  0,8  60,9  18,9  256,1  3.553,2 
Electric equipment  19,1  25,6  40,2  36,0  2.125,2 
Machinery 36,6  101,9  94,6  354,6  4.148,9 
(Services) 837,2  205,6  1.552,5  2.159,8  13.501,3 





1.B: Imports (from) [cont.] 
REGIONS 
SECTORS 
Mexico US  AC RoWH  EU25 
Grains  17,6  -  0,1 15,0 0,2 
Vegetables & fruits  9,7  3,3  79,1  114,5  32,5 
Oilseeds & soybeans  1,8  0,7  0,1  2,0  1,1 
Sugar  - - - - - 
Coffee, rice & others  38,4  0,7  13,3  13,6  48,7 
Animal  products 224,2  29,5  110,9 180,1 310,5 
Bovine meat (ab)   4,9  -  -  2,3  3,7 
Poultry meat (ab)  3,5  -  0,6  8,2  21,0 
Dairy products (ab)  11,0  0,2  -  4,2  41,1 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  26,4  5,0  1,2  60,5  272,3 
Vegetable oils (ab)  8,6  0,1  2,4  0,2  81,9 
Minerals  166,9  21,1  105,3 298,6 381,5 
Energy products  337,8  -  773,5  100,3  79,4 
Text. & apparel  163,7  32,5  31,3  60,5  357,7 
Leather, wood, paper  446,7  14,6  40,9  464,3  894,7 
Other light manufac.  109,8  4,9  6,8  15,5  177,8 
Chemicals & plastics  4.950,9  470,2  252,1  485,1  5.389,5 
Ferrous metals  105,3  13,4  5,9  20,2  438,1 
Non-ferrous  metals  545,4  16,2  172,3 423,3 964,1 
Motor vehicles  537,4  232,8  9,8  69,6  2.516,1 
Other transp. equip.  2.075,4  0,7  -  92,1  951,9 
Electric equipment  3.633,5  200,3  0,7  254,0  1.784,6 
Machinery 5.211,3  147,8  58,3  292,8  7.367,9 
(Services) 4.129,2  209,0  98,8  1.002,9  9.650,2 





1.B: Imports (from) [end] 
REGIONS 
SECTORS 
Japan China  Asia10 RoW 
TOTAL 
Grains -  -  -  0,7  33,4 
Vegetables & fruits  -  10,5  3,3  28,2  281,2 
Oilseeds & soybeans  -  0,1  -  1,1  6,9 
Sugar  - - - - - 
Coffee, rice & others  4,5  4,6  27,7  68,6  219,9 
Animal products  5,8  21,4  53,2  257,3  1.192,9 
Bovine meat (ab)   -  -  0,3  2,8  14,0 
Poultry  meat  (ab)  0,2 -  - 0,4  33,8 
Dairy products (ab)  -  -  -  21,0  77,5 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  0,4  0,1  0,8  42,7  409,3 
Vegetable oils (ab)  0,1  -  33,4  11,8  138,4 
Minerals 47,8  54,8  38,6  143,0  1.257,5 
Energy products  42,6  185,6  27,4  2.399,6  3.946,1 
Text. & apparel  18,4  302,7  597,2  368,0  1.932,0 
Leather, wood, paper  23,6  177,0  149,3  117,4  2.328,5 
Other  light  manufac.  33,6 295,7  100,5 37,2 781,9 
Chemicals & plastics  532,5  550,4  805,6  2.582,7  16.018,9 
Ferrous metals  68,6  23,0  59,4  186,5  920,4 
Non-ferrous metals  143,8  117,0  111,5  263,0  2.756,6 
Motor vehicles  847,5  8,2  301,7  307,7  4.830,8 
Other transp. equip.  135,3  87,5  70,2  90,5  3.503,7 
Electric equipment  807,1  644,8  2.110,5  735,9  10.171,5 
Machinery 1.496,2  830,6  1.053,0  1.156,7  17.614,5 
(Services) 699,7  297,4  2.614,2  2.948,1  21.649,5 






Table 2: Mercosul’s trade flows with the US, the EU25 and China – a few summary 




US EU25  China 
Agriculture 1.372,3  6.460,7  1.632,3 
Agribusiness 306,7  4.702,0  29,0 
Energy 691,1  1.623,8  465,3 
Light Manufactures  3.058,9  1.386,7  -260,8 
Heavy Manufactures  -7.190,4  -14.279,6  -1.724,1 
TOTAL BALANCE  -1.761,3  -106,4  131,7 





Table 3: Mercosul’s trade flows with the US, the EU25 and China – exports and 
imports profiles, by groups (in per cent). 
REGIONS 
US EU25  China  GROUPS 
X M X M X M 
Agriculture  9,9  1,6 31,1 1,8 48,4 1,1 
Agribusiness  2,1 0,3  23,3  1,9 0.8 0,0 
Energy  7,1 2,7 9,5 2,1  20,2  7,3 
Light  Manufactures  22,4 3,9 12,8 6,5 14,9  23,4 









Table 4: Mercosul’s FTA with the US (Scenario A): Trade flows changes by Regions 




I II  III  IV  V 
US 56.92  60.67  21.24  52.44  33.39 
Mexico -1.67 0.50  0.62  0.57  7.16 
Andean -0.26 0.48  1.00  1.04  5.27 
RoWH -0.51 0.85 0.42 0.75 6.35 
EU25 -1.64  0.71 2.18 1.32 8.96 
Japan -1.57  1.46 2.36 1.89 8.96 
China   -0.93  1.01  2.46  2.39  10.77 
Asia10 -0.57 0.88 2.33 1.00 7.81 





I II  III  IV  V 
US  175.50  192.49 54.44 141.28 64.45 
Mexico -0.56 -1.73 -2.74 -3.17 -9.06 
Andean 0.39 -1.34  -1.58  -2.28  -7.55 
RoWH 0.01  -1.76  -2.39  -0.95  -9.37 
EU25 0.31  -1.59  -2.43  -2.23  -12.01 
Japan 2.94  -1.69  -1.41  -5.21  -12.09 
China   0.67  -1.30  -1.73  -5.06  -10.94 
Asia10 2.02  -1.12  -1.54  -3.59  -9.26 
RoW 0.90  -1.57  -1.52  -3.16  -9.20 
Key to the Groups [(number of sectors)]: I – agriculture (6), II – agribusiness (5), III – energy 





Table 5: Mercosul’s FTA with the EU25 (Scenario B): Trade flows changes by Regions 




I II  III  IV  V 
US -17.08  -6.49  -3.51  -4.05  -2.09 
México -18.51 -2.75 -3.15 -2.84 -2.39 
Andean -21.89 -8.28 -5.45 -0.96  1.02 
RoWH -17.26  -5.71 -2.15 -3.05 1.52 
EU25  79.72 144.99 54.04 100.41 69.21 
Japan -26.65  -5.72  -11.30  -7.99 3.36 
China   -17.32  -16.08  -11.35  -8.14  3.75 
Asia10 -21.28  -11.20  -11.89  -7.79 3.46 





I II  III  IV  V 
US 57.04  10.19  5.02  0.28  -9.82 
México 51.61 8.11  4.38 -0.34 -7.38 
Andean 43.52 16.76 5.08  0.16 -6.89 
RoWH 44.76 6.66  4.52  1.51 -8.04 
EU25  312.61  201.38 86.58 117.17 73.11 
Japan 66.33  9.35 2.18  -2.11  -10.72 
China   49.09  8.21  5.12  -2.04  -8.97 
Asia10 62.53  26.85 2.51 -0.78 -6.89 
RoW 58.03  10.22  5.49  -0.41  -7.73 
Key to the Groups [(number of sectors)]: I – agriculture (6), II – agribusiness (5), III – energy 







Table 6: Mercosul’s FTAs with the US and the EU25: Total trade flows changes 
(exports and imports) under each scenario. 
The US FTA  The EU25 FTA 
SECTORS 
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Grains 1.09  66.74  11.86  59.48 
Vegetables & fruits  3.70  5.69  28.67  46.25 
Oil seeds & soybeans  0.39  34.03  -5.26  62.06 
Sugar  6.01 - 7.59 - 
Coffee, rice & others  7.95  35.52  41.61  135.55 
Animal products  7.81  33.57  40.98  123.91 
Bovine meat (ab)   3.76  34.42  269.02  25.99 
Poultry meat (ab)  4.36  6.70  81.55  60.92 
Dairy products (ab)  13.02  32.65  0.33  114.67 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  25.71  10.67  10.23  118.95 
Vegetable oils (ab)  0.70  13.62  24.32  198.44 
Minerals 5.89  12.87  14.03  33.53 
Energy products  2.04  0.80  -0.08  5.72 
Text. & apparel  25.09  14.44  42.36  31.80 
Leather,  wood,  paper  20.87 12.00 23.30 23.88 
Other  light  manufac.  6.21 42.02 9.34 62.56 
Chemicals  &  plastics  15.08 7.89 12.37 8.44 
Ferrous metals  13.52  7.63  15.75  26.12 
Non-ferrous metals  12.83  9.38  24.88  15.86 
Motor  vehicles 19.11 22.27  9.95 100.34 
Other transp. equip.  26.05  41.32  4.42  25.21 
Electric equipment  20.73  5.61  8.91  3.71 
Machinery  16.35 11.61 18.26 15.76 
(Services) 0.97  -1.10  -2.67  3.29 
TOTAL 9.51  9.09  19.42  18.57 
Correlation between the two patterns: i) Exports,  -0.08 (without bovine meat),  -0.21 (with 









I II  III  IV  V  
US  -1.43 -1.06 -0.19 -0.83 0.93  0.18 
Mexico  -1.49 -0.54 -0.10 -0.53 1.57  1.06 
Andean  -1.09 -0.60 -0.54 -0.01 0.40  0.02 
RoWH  -1.21 -0.72 -0.26 -0.56 0.22 -0.27 
EU25  -1.75 -0.66 -0.81 -1.64 0.20 -0.94 
Japan  -2.07 -1.23 -0.80 -1.50 -1.48 -1.45 
China    31.20 117.26 10.29 311.57  490.03  141.13 
Asia10  -1.54 -0.85 -0.75 -1.90 -1.30 -1.29 





I II  III  IV  V  
US 2.32  1.35  0.44  -2.75  -0.86  -0.84 
Mexico 1.81 1.45  -0.05  -2.75  -1.41  -1.34 
Andean 1.31 1.15 0.63  -2.03  -0.15  -0.37 
RoWH 1.29  1.48  0.22  -0.44  -0.49  -0.14 
EU25 2.28  1.39  0.20  -2.29  -1.51  -1.40 
Japan 3.95  1.43  0.06  -7.40  -1.97  -2.01 
China   196.71  339.17  35.77  286.55  103.92  142.74 
Asia10 3.35  0.99  0.05  -3.21  -1.18  -1.40 
RoW 2.66  1.47  0.73  -2.50  -0.76  -0.27 
Key to the Groups [(number of sectors)]: I – agriculture (6), II – agribusiness (5), III – energy 







Table 8: The Mercosul-China FTA: Total and Chinese trade flows changes (exports and 
imports). 
Total flows  Mercosul-China flows 
SECTORS 
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Grains  -0,46 0,63 10,46 - 
Vegetables & fruits  -0,01 5,56  - 154,81 
Oil seeds & soybeans  -0,05 1,73 0,40 88,76 
Sugar  3,23 8,80  427,89 - 
Coffee, rice & others  3,61 6,09  264,23 140,81 
Animal products  2,29 0,63  308,42 229,70 
Bovine meat (ab)   -0,67 1,39  514,65 0,00 
Poultry meat (ab)  -0,94 1,41  122,58 0,00 
Dairy products (ab)  -0,82 1,61 0,00 0,00 
Bev. & tobacco (ab)  -0,84 1,58  192,63 339,17 
Vegetable oils (ab)  -0,18 0,91 95,92 0,00 
Minerals  0,72 5,73 9,99 130,07 
Energy products  -0,26 1,08 17,68 7,91 
Text. & apparel  83,24 42,45  863,32 281,98 
Leather, wood, paper  4,73 5,80  129,30 72,66 
Other light manufac.  9,92 148,71  970,99 419,25 
Chemicals & plastics  2,20 2,00  158,52 52,93 
Ferrous metals  1,10 3,94  87,85 100,15 
Non-ferrous metals  0,28 4,54  165,61 95,67 
Motor vehicles  43,81 -3,47  1.551,86 462,18 
Other transp. equip.  3,05 12,58  110,77 411,27 
Electric equipment  3,27 1,62  233,41 35,33 
Machinery  6,19 4,50  218,07 156,30 
(Services)  -1,12 1,40 -1,64 1,62 
TOTAL 5,04  4,84  133,09  131,12 
Correlation between the two patterns: i) Exports, 0.62 (without motor vehicles), 0.69 (with 




Table 9: Sectoral changes in labour and output in the three scenarios – correlations 









US 1  0,65  0,20  0,27  0,07  0,84  1,82 
EU25  0,44  1 0,46  0,31  0,76  0,88  8,46 




Table 10: Total output changes (percentage from base values), for the three scenarios. 
 
 Scenarios  
SECTORS 
Base 
values  A B C 
Grains 7,9  0,11  2,50  -0,13 
Vegetables and Fruits  5,3  0,28  1,65  -0,17 
Oilseeds & Soybeans  12,5  0,24  0,90  -0,10 
Sugar 9,6  1,54  1,28  0,78 
Coffee, Rice & Others  12,4  0,47  2,19  0,23 
Animal Products  63,6  0,08  2,12  0,03 
Bovine Meat  16,8  0,61  20,63  -0,01 
Poultry Meat   7,0  1,67  23,06  -0,39 
Dairy Products  16,3  0,10  -0,88  0,04 
Bever. and Tobaccos  13,0  0,37  -4,28  -0,04 
Vegetable Oils  15,1  0,26  8,56  -0,13 
Minerals 25,8  0,21  0,39  -0,10 
Energy Products  35,5  -0,03  -1,60  -0,23 
Textiles & Apparel  26,2  0,64  0,02  1,52 
Leather, Wood, Paper  45,2  3,81  3,31  0,55 
Other Light Manufac.  15,8  -1,80  -2,71  -6,74 
Chemical & Plastics  60,0  -1,14  -1,96  -0,10 
Ferrous metals  20,8  2,32  -0,71  0,63 
Non-ferrous Metals  27,0  -0,92  -2,11  -0,04 Motor Vehicles  23,6  0,60  -16,34  11,14 
Other Transp. Equip.  15,7  -4,37  -13,81  2,58 
Electric Equipment  13,6  1,08  0,60  0,16 
Machinery 31,0  -4,56  -5,28  -0,92 
Utilities & Construction  124,2  -0,85  -0,25  0,15 
Trade and Services  641,9  0,10  -0,27  -0,06 
Total 1286,0  -0,03  -0,21  0,17 




Table 11: A few figures of merit: Welfare changes and total trade flows variations 





US EU25  China 
Real GDP    438,1  0,189  0,788  0.298 
Welfare (EV)  75,7  0,377  0,482  0.257 
Exports  *  72,8 11,09  23,52 6,18 
Imports  *  68,5 12,31  23,40 5,93 
* only merchandise trade 
 
 
Table 12: Mercosul’s trade flows induced by the China FTA – exports and imports 
profiles (in per cent) and trade balance (in million US$), by groups. 
 
China (induced)  Trade Balance 
GROUPS 
X M  X-M 
Agriculture 26,4  1,4 2.081,0 
Agribusiness 0,8  0,0  62,8 
Energy 9,2  4,1  440,9 
Light Manufactures  25,5  37,3  -879,4 
Heavy Manufactures  38,2  57,3  -1.440,9 
TOTAL 100  100  264,4 
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